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I. INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth century, economies of the eastern United States
grew at a rapid rate as a result of railroad linkages between markets
and producers.1 Infrastructure, particularly railroads, was essential to
economic development and was sought after with abandon. State
governments were prompted to provide public credit and subsidies to
private railroads to attract growth in undeveloped areas. However,
economic growth could not always be sustained: Because railroad lines
were sometimes abandoned, the solvency of financing governments was
dangerously impaired due to the liabilities and obligations that had
been incurred. In some cases, financing governments were driven to
near bankruptcy.2  This financial instability spawned a political
reaction that restricted the financial activities of local and state
0 J.D. Candidate 1997, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1993, University of
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1. David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 277-79 (1963).
2. Id. at 278.
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governments.3 Often, state constitutions were amended to prohibit the
granting of public financial aid to private enterprise.4
Washington was not immune from this political reaction and
included in its constitution Article VIII, sections 55 and 76. These
sections prohibit the state and its political subdivisions from loaning
state money or credit, and prevent the gifting of public money or
property, to any private entity, unless necessary to support the poor
and infirm. Nevertheless, a century later, many still view government
mobilization of capital for private enterprise as a key component in
community development and job preservation.7 States and municipali-
ties have adopted programs that authorize incentives and subsidies to
selected industries as a means of inducing private corporations to
operate within their borders.' Competition among individual states
for private industry has again led to speculative financing policies and
burdensome results for taxpayers. 9
3. This period was described colorfully by the Montana Supreme Court in 1925:
[The prohibition] represents the reaction of public opinion to the orgies of extravagant
dissipation of public funds... in aid of the construction of railways, canals, and other
like undertakings during the half century preceding 1880, and it was designed primarily
to prevent the use of public funds raised by general taxation in aid of enterprise
apparently devoted to quasi public purposes, but actually engage in private business.
Nicholas J. Wallwork and Alice S. Wallwork, Protecting Public Funds: A History of Enforcement
of the Arizona Constitution's Prohibition Against Improper Private Benefit from Public Funds, 25
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 351 (1993) (quoting Thaanum v. Bynum Irrigation Dist., 232 P. 528, 530
(Mont. 1925)).
4. Pinsky, supra note 1, at 279. See generally Ralph Finlayson, State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Use of Public Financial Resources in Aid of Private Enterprise, 1 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 177 (1988).
5. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 reads: "Credit Not To Be Loaned[:] The credit of the
state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association,
company or corporation."
6. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 reads:
Credit Not To Be Loaned[:] No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall
hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any
individual, association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of
any association, company or corporation.
7. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT (publication
forthcoming) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
8. See id. See also Antitrust Implications of Sports Franchise Relocation: Testimony to House
Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (Feb. 3, 1996) (statement of Cleveland Mayor Michael White);
Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, the Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of the Public Purpose
Doctrine and a Not-for Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (1994); Hal Lancaster,
Stadium Projects Are Proliferating Amid Debate Over Benefit to Cities, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1987
§ 3, at 37.
9. See supra note 7. See also Charles W. Goldner, Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal
Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 925-27 (1991); John A.
Barnes, The Economy 'Dreams of Fields' Help Spawn New Stadium Deals, INV. BUS. DAILY, Jan.
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In Washington, the courts traditionally interpreted Article VIII,
sections 5 and 7, as prohibiting all state and local funding of private
enterprise, and allowed only a few specific exceptions.10 Over the last
thirty years, however, the Washington State Supreme Court has
broadened these formerly narrow exceptions to the point that few
transactions are found unconstitutional. The court currently reviews
a challenged gift transaction by asking whether the government
expenditures carry out a fundamental governmental purpose, or
whether they were made under the government's proprietary authori-
ty-as if it were a private entity." If the governmental expenditures
carry out a fundamental governmental purpose, no unconstitutional
gifting occurs and the review ends. But if the court finds that
expenditures are pursuant to the government's proprietary authority,
the court examines a transaction for donative intent by the government
and for consideration. If donative intent is found, the adequacy of the
consideration exchanged is closely scrutinized. 2 If no donative intent
is found, then the adequacy of consideration is not closely scrutinized,
but is merely assessed under contract law for legal sufficiency.'3 The
Washington State Supreme Court has never found donative intent and,
thus, has never scrutinized the adequacy of the consideration ex-
changed. The result is that only the most unbalanced of transactions
are prohibited.
This Comment argues that the donative intent analysis shields
government proprietary transactions from proper review by seeking
only prima facie evidence of consideration. The framers' intent was to
protect the public purse from involvement in speculative private
financing; they did not intend Article VIII, sections 5 and 7, to be a
paper tiger.'4 The current standard compromises meaningful review
for the sake of judicial efficiency and deference to the legislature."
The Washington State Supreme Court should closely examine the
16, 1996, at B1.
10. Jay A. Reich, Lending of Credit Reinterpreted: New Opportunities for Public and Private
Sector Cooperation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 639, 645-46 (1984).
11. See City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793, 801
(1987).
12. Id. at 703, 743 P.2d at 805.
13. This test of consideration has been used in various forms since 1965, when the
Washington State Supreme Court adopted it in State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65
Wash. 2d 801, 399 P.2d 623 (1965).
14. See infra notes 20 through 24 and accompanying text, describing the framers' intent.
15. Although the principles of efficiency and deference are worthwhile, in this instance the
language of Article VIII, §§ 5 and 7, is plain and its historical basis has been established. See
Reich, supra note 10; see also Hugh Spitzer, An Analytical View of Recent "Lending of Credit"
Decisions in Washington State, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 195 (1985).
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consideration exchanged in order to comply with the framers' intent.
Additionally, public policy, state economic interests, and case law all
urge close judicial scrutiny. This Comment recommends that
Washington adopt a new standard, similar to the standard used in at
least two other states, 16 that reviews the transaction by engaging in an
individualized balancing test to ensure that the consideration exchanged
is reasonable. Without a new standard, concerned members of the
public are effectively precluded from raising legal challenges to a wide
range of transactions conducted by various government and administra-
tive agencies, and the special purpose of the prohibitions in protecting
public funds is subverted.
This Comment is divided into four parts. First, it traces the
historical emergence of the current standard of constitutional analysis
under Article VIII, sections 5 and 7. Second, the Comment discusses
the court's constitutional analysis and its relation to the historical intent
of the framers, and proposes a new standard of review. Third, the
proposed and current standards are applied to two instances of modem
public financial assistance to private enterprise: legislative financing of
a thoroughbred racetrack, and a state agency's subsidy of intrastate
freight rail. Finally, this Comment concludes that the proposed
standard should be adopted.
II. THE HISTORY OF WASHINGTON STATE'S GIFT PROHIBITION
The current approach to examining public financial assistance to
private enterprise is best analyzed by reference to its historical
development. Since the Washington Constitution was ratified, Article
VIII, sections 5 and 7, has been interpreted in a dichotomous manner.
The courts, historically, either adhered to strict constitutional
construction, or to an evolving standard of analysis by exception.
Although the two methods are seemingly at odds, the Washington
State Supreme Court has consistently applied this dichotomous
approach. Such an approach has created a standard that is extremely
accommodating to the needs of private enterprise. This section will
trace the components of each constitutional prohibition and the court's
various exceptions to those prohibitions in an effort to explain the
reasons for, and the problems with, the current standard. 17  The
16. The test that will be adopted later in this Comment is the test currently used in Arizona.
Kentucky uses a similar test. See generally Wallwork, supra note 3, at 366-68.
17. In the following sections, Article VIII, §§ 5 and 7 will be addressed in tandem, based on
a court tradition of one provision encompassing and providing precedent for the other. "Despite
differences in wording the court interprets article 8, sections 5 and 7 identically, construing them
to contain similar prohibitions and exceptions." Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 701, 743
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history of the court's interpretation of each prohibition to be examined
in this Comment can be loosely grouped into four sections: the
inception of constitutional restrictions, the period of inconsistency, the
period of confusion, and the period of clarity.
A. Washington State Constitutional Convention:
The Framers' Intent
In 1889, Article VIII, sections 5 and 7, was adopted at the
Washington constitutional convention."8 In adopting sections 5 and
7, those attending the convention were primarily concerned with the"protection of [the] weak from the strong within," and the protection
of taxpayers and the public purse from the consequence of corporate
political clout.19 The prohibitions contained the broadest language
available from the models submitted to the convention.2 0  The
language was even understood to bar private entities from participating
in quasi-public concerns such as transportation and energy utilities.2'
With such strong language, two distinct policies underlay the
prohibitions: "The first is a fear of the unfortunate, vicious or
disastrous results that might occur if public assets were used to
subsidize private parties. The second is a fear of government's
entanglement with private enterprise to the detriment of both the
private recipient and the public donor." 22  The framers' intent and
broad language formed the basic analytic framework from which
Washington courts have analyzed cases ever since, although it was only
a few decades before the court began to create exceptions within this
framework.
P.2d at 804. See also Adams v. Univ. of Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986);
Morgan v. Dept. of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942). For a further discussion
the tandem application of WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (actions of the state) and § 7 (actions of
political subdivisions), see COLLIN KIPPEN, ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 5 AND 7: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PROVISIONS, THEIR IMPACT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE, 1-11
to 1-18 (Seattle City Light 1979).
18. QUENTIN SMITH, JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, 1889 675 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
19. Id. at 682. See also City of Marysville v. State of Washington, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 54-56,
676 P.2d 989, 992-93 (1984); SMITH, supra note 18, at 675-84.
20. SMITH, supra note 18, at 675-84.
21. Id. at 680.
22. KIPPEN, supra note 17, at 1-9.
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B. Period of Inconsistency: Gifting of Public Funds
In the first half of the twentieth century, Washington courts
analyzed public gifts under a literal reading of the constitutional
prohibitions. However, the standard that began as specific in
application gradually became inconsistent as courts began to incorpo-
rate various exceptions into the prohibitions.
Initially, a gift was defined as an act that would decrease the
state's general fund and gratuitously benefit the recipients.23 In 1914,
in Rands v. Clarke County,2 4 where one county constructed a bridge
in conjunction with a county in an adjoining state, the court defined a
gift broadly as money to, or in aid of, private enterprise. However, the
court distinguished among types of private enterprises in both gifting
of funds and lending of credit, holding those enterprises "whose
functions are wholly public" are exempt.2" This distinction marked
the beginning of a course of opinions that strictly interpreted the
language of the provisions, but provided exemptions for certain
judicially defined public functions.26 Soon after, in Johns v. Wads-
worth,27 the court prohibited county money from being used to assist
a private corporation in promoting an agricultural fair. The court
applied the same logic as in Rands, stating the gift provision "directly
and unequivocally prohibits all gifts of money, property, or credit to,
or in aid of, any corporation .. "28 The court found no public
purpose because the appropriation was to a private organization merely
for a "public good," not for a wholly public purpose; a reasoning that
prohibited even minor gifts from which the public might benefit
indirectly.29 Thus, for two decades exemptions for public appropria-
tions that produced only incidental private benefits were not permitted.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the court's interpretation shifted further
from a strict construction of the gifting provisions to allowing the
distribution of funds for certain government programs.30 Throughout
23. See, e.g., Rands v. Clarke County, 79 Wash. 152, 139 P. 1090 (1914).
24. 79 Wash. 152, 139 P. 1090 (1914).
25. Id. at 157, 139 P. at 1092. Further, the court viewed a wholly public purpose as
involving the federal or state government or some branch thereof. Id. See also Lancey v. King
County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 P. 645, 646-47 (1896). The "public purpose" exception has been the
source of much comment in American legal history. See generally Reich, supra note 10, at 641-43.
26. See generally Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
27. 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914).
28. Id. at 354, 141 P. at 893.
29. Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wash. 2d 94, 101-03, 459
P.2d 633, 637-39 (1969).
30. See Reich, supra note 10, at 643.
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this period, the courts seemed disinclined to interfere in fundamental
governmental activities and attempted to reconcile the exemptions they
granted with the framers' intent.31 For example, in State ex. rel.
Washington Navigation Co. v. Pierce County,32 the court disallowed
subsidies granted by a county to a private company for ferry service
because the county failed to retain public control over future service
operations. The court emphasized, however, that a different result
would be warranted if the public had retained control over the ferries,
and the Legislature had authorized the leasing of the ferries to private
operators.33 In State v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Yakima,34 the court
upheld state attempts to recover funeral payments made to a deceased
citizen on the ground that the estate was large enough to defray
costs. 35 The court commented that as a matter of strict constitutional
construction, state funds or credit could not be used to aid private
persons, but support of needy persons was a recognized public
governmental function, and therefore justified an exception to the gift
provisions.36 Thus, courts during this period provided exemptions for
appropriations with public control and recognized governmental
functions, thereby narrowing the prohibition for the sake of govern-
ment while simultaneously advocating strict construction of the
constitutional provisions.
The following decades mirrored this broadening trend of gift
analysis, expanding the categories of exemptions while announcing a
strict constitutional construction. In Washington State Highway
Comm'n v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co.,37 the court held that a
statute that required payment of removal and relocation costs to private
utilities built on state rights of way was unconstitutional. Although a
public purpose was found, it did not alter the payment's status as a
prohibited gift.3" The performance of private utility services did not
31. A period different from the history of the founders where even quasi public control was
seen as restricted.
32. 184 Wash. 414, 425, 51 P.2d 407, 411 (1935).
33. See, e.g., Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 126 P. 628 (1912) (lease by port to
private party upheld because port reserved power to regulate wharfage charges).
34. 20 Wash. 2d 588, 591, 148 P.2d 323, 325 (1942).
35. See also Morgan, 14 Wash. 2d at 156, 127 P.2d at 686 (pension payments to benefit
persons without resources and income is not a gift).
36. See Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 575 (1897) (In regards to the debt limitation
provision, a recognized governmental function is excepted because "[debt limitations] would
destroy the efficiency of the agencies established by the constitution to carry out the recognized
and essential powers of government. It cannot be conceived that the people who framed and
adopted the constitution had such consequences in view.").
37. 59 Wash. 2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
38. Id. at 224, 367 P.2d at 610.
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constitute a state purpose, where such facilities were owned and
operated by the state, but instead unlawfully benefited a private
enterprise.3 9 In addition, the court continued to define a gift as an
appropriation that decreased the state general fund while gratuitously
benefiting the recipient.40  Alternatively, in Miller v. City of
Tacoma,41 the court held that the acquisition and redevelopment of
blighted urban areas, and subsequent resale to private interests,
constituted a public purpose justifying public expenditure.42 In
Miller, the court determined that the public purpose was the true basis
of the program in that any benefits to unknown, unforeseeable
purchasers were purely incidental.43 This resulted in changing the
requirements of a public purpose toward exemptions; and the court's
analysis of a public purpose became more subjective. "[W]hether the'contemplated use be really public' is solely a judicial question and
ultimately must be decided by this court."44  Thus, at the close of
this period the court broke new ground. Transactions with private
benefits, not primarily for the public interest, were now being allowed,
narrowing the scope of the prohibitions.
C. Period of Confusion
The movement to allow private benefits accelerated radically two
years after Miller with the advent of consideration analysis in State ex
Tel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle.4" In O'Connell, expenditures made
by the Port for the purpose of promotional hosting of shippers and
other private individuals were held to be an unconstitutional gift.46
The court brought new elements to -the prohibition by adopting a
contract model for engaging in gift analysis. The shift again redefined
what constitutes a gift by moving from the previous conceptions of gift
as a loss to the state treasury and benefit to a private recipient, to the
conception of a gift as "[a] voluntary transfer of personal property
without consideration... A parting by owner with property without
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464, 467 (1963).
42. Id. at 382-83, 378 P.2d at 469-70.
43. Id. at 387-88, 378 P.2d at 472-73.
44. Id. at 383, 378 P.2d at 470 (quoting Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 817,
341 P.2d 171, 189 (1959)). See also Scott Paper Co. v. Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 33, 578 P.2d
1292, 1300 (1978) (no legislative attempt to define a gift for the constitutional provision would
be meaningful because construction of the constitution is a judicial function).
45. 65 Wash. 2d 801, 804-06, 399 P.2d 623, 625-26 (1965).
46. Id. at 806, 399 P.2d at 626.
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pecuniary consideration. ' 47  Under this analysis, the court required
a "corresponding legal obligation of any kind" imposed on persons
hosted by the Port in order for the expenditure to be constitutional.48
Two crucial policies in defining "gifts" arose from this definition.
First, to constitute a gift, a transfer of government funds to a private
enterprise must be without consideration. Second, to constitute a gift,
the governmental unit performing the transfer must possess the
intention to give a gift.49 Further, in applying a contract model the
court adopted a passive approach, determining whether the consider-
ation which flowed to the public supported the transaction. No longer
would the court perform an in-depth examination for decreases in the
general fund, but instead it would apply common rules of legal
consideration."0 At the same time, the court continued to apply its
dichotomous approach between strict construction review and exception
analysis. While the court reasoned that promotional activities serve a
public purpose, the court also engaged in a literal reading of the
constitutional provisions to determine purposes for which private
entities may be given public money or property. Even with this broad
constitutional interpretation, government actions serving a business
proprietary function were still viewed as facially unconstitutional. In
O'Connell, the court moved further away from a literal reading of the
gift provision standard by adopting an exemption for appropriations
supported by valid consideration and by applying a judicial finding of
public purpose."1 In retrospect, consideration analysis signaled the
beginning of the end for the dichotomy in interpretation. Private
benefit theory was established, which made the framers' method of
prohibiting public gifting obsolete.
The new consideration standard was confusing in application, and
raised concerns over the framers' intent and the plain language of the
provision. During the 1970s and 1980s, the court's gift analysis
47. Id. at 804, 399 P.2d at 625 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 817 (4th ed. 1957)).
48. Id.
49. For further explanation of voluntariness, see State ex rel. Madden v. Public Util. Dist.
No. 1, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 223, 517 P.2d 585, 588 (1973) (no intent to give a gift because no
opportunity to exercise volitional capacity) and Scott Paper Co., 90 Wash. 2d at 32-33, 578 P.2d
at 1299-1300 (adequate consideration at the time of transaction and thus no intent to give a gift).
50. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 62.
51. Even with the shift, the court was satisfied with the language constraints of the gift
prohibition, stating that
[i]f Article 8, § 7, is too restrictive in its terms, that is a matter for the citizens of this
state to correct through the amendatory process. It is not for this court to engraft an
exception where none is expressed in the constitutional provision, no matter how
desirable or expedient such an exception might seem.
O'Connell, 65 Wash. 2d at 806, 399 P.2d at 626-27.
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wavered between applying strict constitutional construction and
granting exemptions.5 2 Because several commentators have examined
this period closely, this discussion will be limited.53
Anderson v. O'BrienS4 exemplifies how the court analyzed public
gifting during this period. In Anderson, an Indian tribe used public
funds to construct buildings; the buildings were subsequently leased to
private firms. The funds were invested to combat public problems
attendant to unemployment in the tribal community. The court held
that private benefit did not render the public program unconstitutional,
for the private benefit was incidental to the public purpose of resolving
unemployment. 5 The appropriation was not a gift, but an expendi-
ture of public money in return for which the public received valid
consideration. The court's decision marked an expansion in the
definition of what constitutes consideration in public-private transac-
tions. This rationale barred transactions in which the private benefit
was more than incidental. In Louthan v. King County,56 the court
upheld the sale of general obligation bonds which financed the
purchase of development rights for open space lands. The court again
redefined the meaning of a gift, identifying a two-prong test that
required intention to give a gift (donative intent), and lack of "valu-
able" consideration. 7 This test eventually became the model for the
court's current analysis.
In cases that followed, the court applied an ever-broadening
definition of consideration. For example, in In re Marriage of
Johnson,"8 a statute which allowed the Department of Social and
Health Services to collect past-due child support for children who did
not receive public assistance was ruled exempt from the gift provision.
The court found that the expenditure furthered a recognized govern-
mental function accomplished by a private benefit.5 9 The court also
ruled that the benefit returned to the public served as valid consider-
ation for the public expenditure.60  Commentators criticized the
Johnson logic as unreasonably general; if consideration can be merely
some public benefit in return for public expenditure, then any public
52. See, e.g., Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974).
53. See Spitzer, supra note 15; Reich, supra note 10.
54. 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974).
55. Id. at 70-71, 524 P.2d at 395.
56. 94 Wash. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980).
57. Id. at 428, 617 P.2d at 981.
58. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
59. Id. at 261-64, 634 P.2d at 880-82.
60. Id. at 262, 634 P.2d at 881 (citing Northwest Bell, 59 Wash. 2d at 227, 367 P.2d at 612).
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benefit which otherwise would be labeled a gift would be constitu-
tional.61 Due to this criticism, this approach was never applied again.
Later cases further demonstrate a hard look approach to the adequacy
of consideration in acts conferring public benefit, but not for actions
under the government's proprietary function.62
Since the 1940s, the court has often appeared dissatisfied with the
language of the gift provision as it was written by the framers. Its
dissatisfaction, however, remained within the prohibition framework
envisioned by the framers, even when it did not closely follow
prohibition language. After O'Connell, as the following sections will
show, the court's adherence to its prior analytical framework became
a mere formality.
D. Lending of Public Credit: A Parallel History
The Washington State Supreme Court mirrored the gift provi-
sion's constitutional analysis dichotomy in interpreting lending of
public credit provisions, but with greater variance in application. The
framers intended to prohibit public loans in the ordinary and popular
sense, between a lender and a borrower, where the security of funds
was questioned.63 Lending of credit was first defined as "[t]he
correlative of a debt; .. .that which was incoming or due to one."64
The provision was typically applied where the state or its political
subdivision acted as a surety to private enterprise, loaned government
status to private enterprise, acted as a financing conduit for private
purposes, or allowed private risk taking in the government's name.65
Thus, the nature of the nineteenth century credit schemes and the
above definition suggest that the lending of credit prohibition was
meant to stop activities that jeopardized public assets.
In the early 1900s, the court first considered the lending of credit
prohibition in Seattle and Lake Washington Waterway Co. v. Seattle
Dock Co.66 The state contracted with a private developer to dredge
a waterway and deposit the material on state land. Payment was made
61. See Spitzer, supra note 15, at 209-12.
62. In subsequent case law, the court inquired beyond consideration and into valuations of
its sufficiency and fairness. That evolution expanded the scope of the gift prohibition and limited
transfers of public funds to private individuals. See, e.g., Washington Natural Gas, 77 Wash. 2d
at 101-04, 459 P.2d at 637-39; State ex Tel. Gorton v. Port of Walla Walla, 81 Wash. 2d 872,
880, 505 P. 2d 796, 801 (1973).
63. KIPPEN, supa note 17, at IV-12.
64. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 267, 634 P.2d at 883 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 891
(1891)).
65. See KIPPEN, supra note 17.
66. 35 Wash. 503, 77 P. 845 (1904), affd, 195 U.S. 624 (1904).
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by attaching a lien to the deposit site, payable when the deposit
property was sold. The court found no lending of public credit
because no state debt incurred from the lien-sale.67 The court
adhered to the framers' intent by prohibiting public guarantees of
private debts. However, just as with the gift provision, the court
created an exception, which was later termed "risk of loss."6 This
limited exception allowed lending of public credit if there was no risk
of negative impact on the public purse.6 9
The court continued to parallel gift prohibition analysis when
interpreting the public lending provisions into the 1940s. In Gruen v.
State Tax Commission,7" taxpayers challenged an excise tax on
cigarettes for retiring bonds, supported by state credit, that were sold
to create a bonus for war veterans. The bonus scheme was upheld
because the veterans were not debtors, and sustained no liability to the
bondholders.71 The court reasoned that "[t]he state recognizes the
... [veteran] as in the nature of a creditor, to whom the state proposes
to pay its recognized obligation."72 There was no 'risk of loss,' and
a public purpose exception was realized through selling bonds which
directly benefited veterans. At the same time, however, the court
adopted a new definition for lending credit which extended the framers'
intent to forbid suretyship of private enterprise.7 3 In Berglund v. City
of Tacoma,74 the city established a fund to guarantee warrants that
were issued to finance a Local Improvement District (LID). The
purpose of the project was to extend water services to locations outside
the city. If default occurred, the fund would be subrogated to warrant
holders including a lien on property in the LID. The court validated
the loan of credit because the city eventually would become the owner
67. Id. at 515, 77 P. at 848.
68. Reich, supra note 10, at 644-45.
69. See Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 267, 634 P.2d at 833 (citing State ex rel. Graham v.
Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 676-77, 497 P.2d 924 (1972)).
70. 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) (overruled by State ex rel. Fin. Comm'n v. Martin,
62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963)).
71. Gruen, 35 Wash. 2d at 30, 211 P.2d at 668.
72. Id. (quoting Grout v. Kendall, 192 N.W. 529, 533 (Iowa 1923)).
73. The court in Gruen adopted an Iowa court's definition of a loan of credit:
[The prohibition against the lending of credit] withheld from the constitutional
authorities of the state all power or function or suretyship. It forbade the incurring of
obligations by the indirect method of secondary liability. This is the field and the full
scope of the section. It does not purport to deal with the creation of primary
indebtedness for any purpose whatever.
Grout, 192 N.W. at 531.
74. 70 Wash. 2d 475, 423 P.2d 922 (1967).
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of the water system expansion.7" This ruling loosened the prohibition
on sureties by allowing indirect and contingent liability for public
funds and by recognizing a public control exception to the provisions
regulating the lending of credit.76
The Washington Supreme Court's enforcement of lending of
credit prohibitions continued until the "period of confusion," which
began in the 1970s and continued through the mid-1980s. During this
period, the court integrated its literal reading of the lending of credit
prohibitions with exceptions utilized as factors for review. 77 For
example, in applying the public purpose exception the court announced
a literal reading of the provision, but subsequently used the public
purpose exception as a test to determine constitutionality. 7' The
court required the government to intend a public purpose that not only
satisfied the constitutional prohibition, but also was more than
salutory, to validate the action.79
During this period the court also redefined credit, while muddling
the definition in a series of decisions with alternatively broad and
limiting language that never expressly overruled previous decisions.
Further, this period also mirrored gift analysis by invoking the framers'
intentions regarding the scope of the lending of credit provision.
Initially, the scope of the lending of credit prohibition was
broadened greatly. In Port of Longview v. Longview Taxpayers,0 the
court held lending of credit to include nonrecourse industrial revenue
bonds. Loaning the name of a governmental entity in order to benefit
a private project was considered a loan of public credit, even though
general liability was lacking." In Washington Health Care Facilities
v. Ray,"' the lending of credit prohibition was further expanded to
include private use of government status. The court held that a
governmental entity lends its credit when it allows a private enterprise
75. Id. at 480-81, 423 P.2d at 925-26.
76. Id. at 481, 423 P.2d at 925.
77. See, e.g., Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 810-12, 576 P.2d 54, 57-59
(1978).
78. Id. at 810-11, 576 P.2d at 58-59.
79. Id. at 811-12, 576 P.2d at 58-59.
80. 85 Wash. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974). The lending of credit definition was expanded
here to include industrial revenue bonds, a concept not previously considered by the court. See
also letter from Hugh Spitzer to David Martin (Mar. 22, 1996) (on file with the Seattle University
Law Review).
81. Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d at 231, 533 P.2d at 129.
82. 93 Wash. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).
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to use the government status to obtain property or money which would
not otherwise be obtainable at the same price.8 3
Subsequent decisions, however, restricted the provision's scope by
endorsing several exceptions that validated actions previously defined
as unconstitutional loans of state credit.8 4 For example, in Higher
Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gardner,"5 the state utilized its tax exempt
status to authorize bonds which benefited universities with ties to
religious institutions. The court upheld the bond issuance because the
use of the state's tax exempt status was not a loan of credit.8 6
Decisions like this, where the court both integrated and separated
literal and exception analysis under the guise of the framers' intent,
made this period of interpretation of the lending of credit provision
confusing, a pattern loosely followed by the court throughout the
history of the lending of credit provisions. The trend of inconsistent
decisions in both gift and lending of credit cases, however, ended with
the onset of what can be labeled as a "period of clarity."
E. Period of Clarity - Current Test
In 1986, the Washington State Supreme Court ended some of the
past confusion by cementing the gift prohibition's requirements and
stating the possible exceptions. In Adams v. University of Washing-
ton, 7 the court focused on the consideration analysis as required
under the gift provisions. In Adams, a class of male journeypersons
were paid higher wages by the University than a class of female
nonjoumeypersons although the two groups performed substantially
similar work. 8 The class of workers argued that there was no
economic justification to pay higher wages for nonjourneyperson work,
and therefore no consideration validating the transaction. 9 In a
unanimous opinion, the court held that no gifting of public funds
83. Id. at 113-14, 605 P.2d at 1262-63.
84. See, e.g., Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 261-64, 634 P.2d at 880-82; Washington State House
Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 498-500, 671 P.2d 247, 251-52 (1983); City of
Masysville, 101 Wash. 2d at 50, 676 P.2d at 989.
85. 103 Wash. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985).
86. Id. at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245. The court analyzed the issuance by separating the language
of the lending of credit provisions into elements, and applying the language, an analysis one
commentator found to imply a shift to a literal interpretation of provision language in evaluating
future lending of credit schemes. See Spitzer, supra note 15, at 197.
87. 106 Wash. 2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986). This case is a consolidation of previously
discussed decision and is used to show the direction of court decisions, not as a sign of a key law-
making decision.
88. Id. at 313, 722 P.2d at 75.
89. Id. at 326, 722 P.2d at 82.
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occurred.9" The University received consideration because the unique
skills possessed by male journeypersons were used on occasion.
The opinion in Adams refined the definition of a gift. An
unconstitutional gift was defined as "a decrease in the state general
fund and a gratuitous benefit to a recipient .... The key factor...
[being] lack of consideration." '91 The court limited its gift analysis to
a definition of consideration established by previous cases: "Unless
there is proof of donative intent or a grossly inadequate return, courts
do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. '" 92 The formula
applied separate standards of consideration to different transactions.
For transactions not intended as gifts, the court required bargained-for
consideration.93 For transactions the government intended as gifts,
the court applied an adequacy standard.94 Under this formula, a gift
was found if either donative intent or a lack of consideration was
evident in the transaction.95 The court ruled that the University
received consideration sufficient to support a promise because male
joumeypersons were used on occasion.96
The Adams court made clear that the bargained-for standard of
consideration, not an adequacy standard, was the proper mode of
review for the gifting provisions, stating that "[i]f this court were to
examine the adequacy of wages paid to state employees, it would
intrude upon the freedom of contract, establish a burdensome
precedent for future court calendars, and go beyond its proper
90. Id. at 327-28, 722 P.2d at 82-83.
91. Id. at 327, 722 P.2d at 82. In the view of the court this is an expansion of the "risk of
loss" philosophy.
92. Id. (citing Scott Paper Co., 90 Wash. 2d at 32-33, 578 P.2d at 1299-1300). See also City
of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 717, 720-21, 600 P.2d 1268, 1269-70 (1979) (utilizing a similar
definition of donative intent).
93. Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82.
94. Id. Here, consideration sufficient to support a promise was viewed in its traditional
form: "Any act or forbearance which has been bargained for is consideration sufficient to support
a promise." Id. (citing Huberdeau v. Desmoris, 79 Wash. 2d 432, 439-40, 486 P.2d 1074, 1078
(1971)).
95. Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82. The court's definition of a gift arises from
City of Bellevue, 92 Wash. 2d at 720-21, 600 P.2d at 1269-70 (tips are not gifts within the
meaning of the prohibition). In City of Bellevue, the court stated:
a gift is a voluntary transfer of property without consideration. There is no claim that
the tips concept embodied in article 8, section 7 was meant to be interpreted in any
manner different from the usual and ordinary meaning of gift. Therefore, inherent in
that concept is the necessity of a donative intent .... [If] intent to give a gift is lacking
the elements of a gift are not present and article 8, § 7 does not apply.
Id. at 720, 600 P.2d at 1269 (quoting Scott Paper Co., 90 Wash. 2d at 33, 578 P.2d at 1300).
96. Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82.
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function."97  The court, however, made no reference to what an
adequate level of consideration would be if donative intent were found.
More importantly, the court made no reference to the framers' intent
regarding the gift prohibitions. By limiting consideration analysis to
formal contract rules, the court disregarded the dichotomous approach
for determining donative intent applied in gift cases for one hundred
years. No definitive distinction remained between allowing exceptions
and applying strict construction interpretation, because only a valid
contract was needed.
One year later, in City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Taxpayers,98 the
court reaffirmed the link between donative intent and consideration.
A municipal energy conservation ordinance authorized issuing revenue
bonds and other finances to pay for installing energy conservation
devices in commercial and residential structures. The ordinance was
designed to "acquire" electricity by conservation, with rate payers
having no obligation to pay for the devices received. The Superior
Court of Pierce County found the ordinance unconstitutional, even
though the ordinance was subject only to review on the sufficiency of
the consideration exchanged.99 The trial court determined that the
purchase of energy conservation was authorized by statute and
equivalent to purchasing electricity. However, the court reasoned that
because the amount of money the city would save was unpredictable,
the consideration was inadequate because it was not measurable or
lasting.100  In assessing the inadequacy of the consideration ex-
changed, the trial court conducted an analysis of the statistical
assumptions underlying the ordinance and examined the relative
economic adequacy of the consideration exchanged." 1  Thus, in
Tacoma Taxpayers, the court moved from the established requirements
of finding legally sufficient consideration, and into a review of the
adequacy of consideration exchanged.
On review, the Washington Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction,
found the trial court's analysis inconsistent with Adams, and upheld the
conservation ordinance.0° In reviewing the gifting issue, the court
97. Id.
98. 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987). For possible reasons why the court reviewed
the standard again in 1987, see Department of Labor and Indus. v. Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427,
735 P.2d 1334 (1987). The Wendt opinion is a haphazard analysis of the gift provision; the court
may have been sending a message to lower courts to follow its language,
99. Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 681, 743 P.2d at 794.
100. Id. at 684, 743 P.2d at 795-96.
101. Id.
102. See id. The Superior Court decision was appealed to Division II of the Washington
State Court of Appeals. The taxpayers challenged the municipal and constitutional authority, and
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emphasized the constitutionality of an amendment to the credit
prohibition that allowed municipal utilities to offer loan financing to
residential owners who installed conservation equipment, finding no
preclusion against the direct purchase of conservation. 13
The court next addressed the gift prohibition within the context
of the framers' intent. The court stated, "[i]n recent years we have
narrowed out application of the gift prohibition in an attempt to limit
its scope to the evils the framers sought to prevent."'" Moving
beyond Adams and elaborating on past concerns of public purpose and
the recognized governmental function exception, the court defined a
gift by distinguishing transactions where funds are expended as
entitlement payments lo' in furtherance of government purposes from
expenditures not used for government purposes.
Expenditures not used for government purposes-those made in
furtherance of government's proprietary function-were examined
under the gift test: if donative intent is proven, the adequacy of the
consideration is closely scrutinized; if donative intent is not proven
then the consideration is not scrutinized for adequacy, but is assessed
for legal sufficiency.0 6 This modified the Adams test to focus on
matters of donative intent, or direct evidence of a gift intention, in the
first prong, while eliminating gross inadequacy of exchange, or indirect
evidence of a gift, in the second prong. 07 This modification further
narrowed the test by removing from the analysis transactions where
there was no direct evidence of a gift intention.
Tacoma Taxpayers solidified the two-step analysis, where no
specific gift determination is found.' If the government spends
money to carry out an entitlement, no unconstitutional gift will be
found."°  If expenditures are made pursuant to the government's
proprietary authority, the court will focus on consideration and
donative intent to determine if a gift has been made.' Moreover,
gift exceptions will be permitted where there is incidental benefit. The
Tacoma Taxpayers court stated that "[w]here the public receives
cross-appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 684, 743 P.2d at 796.
103. Id. at 687-90, 743 P.2d at 797-99.
104. Id. at 702, 743 P.2d at 805.
105. Examples of entitlement payments include fare free bus zones and relocation assistance
payments to those displaced by condemnation' See KIPPEN, supra note 17, at 1-14 to 1-18.
106. Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 703, 743 P.2d at 805.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 705, 743 P.2d at 806.
110. Id. at 702-703, 743 P.2d at 805 (citing General Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wash.
2d 579, 587, 716 P.2d 879, 884 (1986)).
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sufficient consideration, and benefit to an individual is only incidental
to and in aid of the public benefit, no unconstitutional gift has
occurred. "1"
In Tacoma Taxpayers, the court found actions taken under the
municipal energy conservation ordinance to serve a business propri-
etary function rather than a governmental function, and thus analyzed
the transaction as an expenditure not used for government pur-
poses. 12 Finding no donative intent or gross inadequacy in the
exchange, the court examined whether the bargained-for consideration
was legally sufficient. The city ordinance was found to provide
measurable savings in the first year of use.113  The actual savings
were not viewed as a generalized public benefit, but as sufficiently
definite to provide consideration." 4
The court also addressed the trial court's determination of future
benefits stating, "[t]he inability to predict the actual savings over the
long run and the specific concerns listed by the trial court, seem
inherent in any prediction of long-term cost effectiveness. The
Legislature has already indicated its willingness to rely on predictions
of future cost effectiveness.""' 5  Thus, the court recognized that
predictions of future benefit, if quantifiable, constitute sufficient
consideration.
The majority opinion in Tacoma Taxpayers, however, was only
carried by a single vote."6 The dissent raised two criticisms of the
gift test, arguing that the plain language of the constitutional provisions
controlled while the protection of public money is paramount." 7
First, the dissent argued that the established means of constitutional
interpretation dictated that where the language of the constitution is
clear, words should be given their plain meaning. This would mean
prohibiting all gifts and loans of money in aid of individuals."'
Finding that there should be no exception, the dissent characterized the
program as prohibited by the constitution. "' Second, the dissent
assailed the gift test, rejecting "the majority's inference that the
constitutionality of Tacoma's conservation program can only be
111. Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 705, 743 P.2d at 806.
112. Id. at 694, 743 P.2d at 801 (citing State v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 834, 523 P.2d
872, 898 (1974)).
113. Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 703-04, 743 P.2d at 805-06.
114. Id. at 704, 743 P.2d at 806.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 705, 743 P.2d at 806.
117. Id. at 706-07, 743 P.2d at 807 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 706, 743 P.2d at 807.
119. Id. at 706-07, 743 P.2d at 807.
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decided by an after-the-fact assessment of cost effectiveness, "120 an
assessment precluded by the current test unless donative intent is
found.
In addressing the program's statutory authority, the court argued
that the preconditions and safeguards instituted by the city to protect
public funds were illusory because consideration was contingent on
market forces.121 While program recipients received conservation
benefits in return for no compensation, recipients also were not
penalized for increasing energy consumption.
The free-market nature of the transaction was not a concern for
the majority which reasoned that all business ventures are subject to
market forces, and all ventures have the same protection with
disincentives to investment in measures that are improperly installed
and not cost effective. 122 The dissent emphasized that the court was
only validating speculation that was reminiscent of the century old
financing schemes that the prohibitions were designed to prevent. The
dissents' reasoning in Tacoma demonstrates that a test for legally
sufficient consideration treats government entities as any other
individual or corporation, by allowing transactions that are speculative
or fiscally irresponsible.
The flaws in the Tacoma Taxpayers majority's reasoning, however,
go beyond the surface. Specifically, gaps exist between the language
of the gift test and its application. Although precluded from making
a cost-effective analysis without donative intent or insufficient
consideration, the majority directly referenced this type of test, stating
that "[u]nless demonstrated as cost effective, Tacoma's direct purchase
program would run afoul of the Article 8, section 7 gift prohibi-
tion."' 23  The statement was made in contrasting loans of public
funds, where preset conditions assure cost effectiveness, with the
conservation direct purchase program, where outside factors could
dictate cost effectiveness.
The faulty nature of the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test is that it
is not broad enough to serve the public interest in public-private
financing programs. When reviewing a major project like a municipal-
ity's direct purchase of energy conservation which involves large
amounts of public funds and affects many citizens, the test is too
narrow to review all of the components of the program. The financing
120. Id. at 708, 743 P.2d at 808,
121. Id. at 707-08, 743 P.2d at 807-08.
122. Id. at 690, 743 P.2d at 798.
123. Id.
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program is not adequately reviewed to determine if it is an unconstitu-
tional gift because limited portions designated as its consideration are
forwarded, which allows the transaction to bypass review. According-
ly, review is unsatisfactory in cases where no donative intent is found,
where large inadequacy in exchange exist, and where there is merely
artificial consideration. A test so narrow is arbitrary and contingent on
a court's nonlegal interest in the transactions to break its confines. 124
Through the language of the provisions, the framers sought to
prevent many of the transactions that are allowed by the current test.
Under this limited review, the government, under the guise of public
policy, is allowed to act with little judicial constraint on its fiscal
powers. Notably, this has resulted in past programs like railroad
bonds, and in current stadium proposals. 125  The courts have taken
on a role that should be left to the Legislature, a point raised,
ironically, in O'Connell (the beginning of consideration analysis):
If Art 8, § 7, is too restrictive in its terms, that is a matter for the
citizens of this state to correct through the amendatory process. It
is not for this court to engraft an exception where none is expressed
in the constitutional provision, no matter how desirable or expedient
such an exception might seem. 126
As it currently stands, however, the courts have cemented the gift test
requirement, but have compromised good policy by overstepping their
constitutional mandate.
The decisions following Adams and Tacoma Taxpayers mirror both
decisions in logic and result. 2 7 The court has failed to invalidate any
government transaction because of insufficient consideration.
Therefore, no transaction has been investigated for adequacy of
consideration. The following section will further discuss problems in
the current test, and will propose an alternate test that analyzes the
adequacy of consideration.
124. See Pinsky, supra note 1, at 307-08.
125. See Barnes, supra note 9, at B1.
126. O'Connell, 65 Wash. 2d at 806, 399 P.2d at 626.
127. See, e.g., Hadley v. Department of Labor and Indus., 116 Wash. 2d 897, 810 P.2d 500
(1991); Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 785 P.2d 447 (1990);
Washington Pub. Util. Dist. Util. System v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clallam County, 112
Wash. 2d 1, 771 P.2d 701 (1989); Northlake Marine Works v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. App.
491, 857 P.2d 283 (1993); Brigade v. Economic Dev. Bd. for Tacoma-Pierce County, 61 Wash.
App. 615, 811 P.2d 697 (1991).
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III. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE ADAMS/TACOMA
TAXPAYERS TEST
The Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test ended the dichotomous
tradition of the courts' analysis of prohibition cases, and provided
government with proprietary rights restrained only by passive contract
law. That dichotomous tradition, however, avoided five problems of
law and public policy inherent in the current test: (1) a liberal legal
test; (2) offense of the framers' intent; (3) the plain language of the
prohibitions; (4) the bypass of constitutional procedure; and (5)
encouragement of speculative financing.
As noted, the primary factor for determining gifts under
Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers is the presence of donative intent, a require-
ment that courts have not realistically enforced. The other require-
ment, consideration, has been found insufficient only once.121 In
addition to each requirement's limited enforcement, case law demon-
strates that each element is malleable in certain applications.1 29  The
current test, in addition to disregarding established historical excep-
tions, has resulted in prohibiting only the most unbalanced of
transactions.
The current test claims to adhere to the framers' intent as the
basis for its analysis,13° but has ironically opened state and local
treasuries to extensive public-private financing that has not been seen
since the railroad bond era. 131 Transactions once in contravention of
the gift prohibition are now found constitutional. Such an ineffective
test offends the framers' intent to protect the public purse and prevent
speculation with its contents.
Further, the plain language of the prohibition is intended to
compel state and local governments to restrict their financing prac-
tices. 132 No exceptions are provided except for the poor and infirm,
and there is no allowance for transactions that benefit the government.
128. See O'Connell, 65 Wash. 2d at 806, 399 P.2d at 626.
129. See, e.g., id.
130. See Tacoma Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d at 701-02, 743 P.2d at 804-05.
131. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 47.76.010-.350 (1994). The statute authorization to solicit
privately financed transportation improvements in Washington State. Projects are owned by the
private sector during construction, turned over to the state, and leased back for operation for up
to fifty years. The private developer is authorized to impose tols or user fees to recover its
investment and allow a reasonable rate of return on investment. Id.; see also WASHINGTON
STATE TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
WORKING PAPERS, WASHINGTON STATE TRANSPORTATION POLICY PLAN (1992).
132. See City of Seattle v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 232, 252-56, 668 P.2d 1266, 1275-78 (1983)
(Rossellini, J., dissenting).
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However, the current test ignores the plain language of the prohibition
and exceptions, not restrictions, are the norm.
The current test also bypasses constitutional procedure, by
accomplishing the goals of previously proposed amendments that failed
to pass.133 From 1961 to 1977, thirty-six amendments of the prohi-
bitions were proposed, but only three were passed.134 These amend-
ments are as important as the prohibitions themselves because they
reflect public concerns that policy makers have viewed as justifying
governmental assistance to private entities.'35 However, bypassing
the established constitutional process through judicial means is
inappropriate. 136 Thus, the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test is prob-
lematic in legal application because it ignores the framers' intent and
removes from the populace a choice over its representatives' financing
practices and its economic future.
Finally, the test encourages a judicially-approved public policy of
providing public financing for private enterprise. There is clear
evidence, however, that such an economic policy is destructive:
Governments tend to compete for private enterprise, buying jobs for
citizens by providing questionable incentives for corporations to remain
or relocate to the state.'37 For example, government entities battle
over the tradition and prestige a professional sports franchise brings to
a city when providing publicly supported stadiums.'38 The winner
is required to build a limited-use sport facility at enormous cost with
little extrinsic return.'39 Economists have urged states to abandon"the war to steal business from one another," and to compete on the
basis of real advantages (schools, location, roads). 4 ° If the constitu-
tion is not utilized to prevent the State of Washington or its subdivi-
sions from engaging in special financing practices, government is likely
133. Id. See generally KIPPEN, supra note 21, at IX 1 to IX 19.
134. See KIPPEN, supra note 17, at El to E46; interview with Dan Grimm, Washington State
Treasurer (July 20, 1995).
135. LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING DESKBOOK 12, at 15 (1986). See generally
ROBERT S. AMDURSKY AND CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1992).
136. See Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 312, 722 P.2d at 74.
137. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT supra note 7.
138. See Barnes, supra note 9, at B1. The real advantages between the localities of TV
market share, fan support and loyalty, and fan knowledge play little part-all that matters is
stadium generated revenue.
139. Although sports teams may provide intrinsic value to a community, it is difficult to
quantify. I am a baseball and football fan, but how do I measure the feeling I get from having
those teams affiliated with the city I live in?
140. See Barnes, supra note 9, at B1.
[Vol. 20:199
Gifting of Funds
to breach the public trust,' while the populace is unnecessarily put
at risk of financial hardship.
The solution to Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers lies in applying a
weighing formula that accomplishes several important goals. These
goals include providing an analysis of the transaction, taking a
comprehensive view of the transaction, and performing a qualitative
comparison of the benefits and problems. Further, a proper test does
not require a complex analysis when rational decisions can be made
based on a simple formula without costly decision making. However,
when a decision is likely to result in far-reaching consequences, a
rigorous, detailed examination is required. Thus, the solution is not
merely to 'weigh' the government's interest, but rather to specifically
ask whether the nature of the interest is within the contemplation of
the language of Article VIII, sections 5 and 7.
A three-part test accomplishes the necessary improvements: (1)
whether the consideration received by the government is measurable;
(2) whether the consideration received by the government is lasting;
and (3) whether that consideration is adequate. Such a test, drawn
partially from that used in other states, 4 2 would fall under the"nonentitlements and proprietary transactions" section of the current
two-part test. Accordingly, if a transaction is not an entitlement, the
three questions would be asked to determine whether a gift had taken
place.
The first two parts of the test arise from the trial court decision
that was overruled in Tacoma Taxpayers. Questions were posed to
determine the project's long-term cost-effectiveness. Here, the
questions serve the same purpose; measurable consideration would not
be sustained by a finding of generalized public benefits. Quantifiable
exchange would be necessary.' Though government is well-suited
to make decisions to provide general public benefits (a source of
continual discussion with the court and commentators), using this basis
to justify transactions unsupported by consideration has been criticized;
"if ... the 'public benefit achieved from such activities is the
"consideration" for the funds expended,' logically any public benefit
from what would otherwise be a gift to a private individual or entity
141. A fundamental precept of good government is that public funds must be used for public
interests. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), and THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (James Madison).
142. For the purposes of this Comment, the other states that wil be used for analysis are
Arizona and Kentucky.
143. See generally Spitzer, supra note 15.
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would be constitutionally acceptable."' 44 Moreover, viewing general-
ized public benefits as consideration was criticized ninety years ago:
[Merely] because a private individual or a corporation uses public
funds or property for a "public purpose" is not sufficient, in and of
itself to remove that use from the [gift and credit] provisions ....
to hold otherwise and say that a "public purpose" was the only
criterion by which the validity of an appropriation of public funds
is to be measured, there would be hardly any limit upon the right
of the state, county, city, or school districts to appropriate moneys
to a private corporation.'
Thus, concrete exchange is required to pass this proper review of the
transaction.
The second part of the test, which requires lasting consideration,
promotes informed decision-making by demanding benefits to be
calculated or quantified on a long-term basis. 146  A review of the
statistical assumptions underlying the transaction also prevents undue
speculation and the diversion of tax revenues from proper governmen-
tal programs. This requirement is utilized in the state of Ken-
tucky,'47 where gift and debt provisions "prohibit any 'transactions
which might result in future liabilities against the general resources of
the state . "'148 In Kentucky, the power to financially obligate
future generations exists only if subject to decisions of future legislative
appropriation and limited revenue schemes."4  Measurable and
lasting consideration properly serves as an important procedural
safeguard when reviewing possible gift transactions with private
enterprise.
The third part, whether there is adequate consideration, is the
most important part of this analysis. Adequate consideration was
established in the Arizona courts under gift and credit prohibitions
144. Spitzer, supra note 15, at 210 (quoting Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 262, 634 P.2d at 881).
See Citizens for Clean Air, 114 Wash. 2d at 39, 785 P.2d at 447.
145. Walwork, supra note 3, at 367 (quoting City of Tempe v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 527
P.2d 515, 521 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (quoting Harrington v. Atteberry, 153 P. 1041, 1042 (N.M.
1916)); see also Spitzer, supra note 15, at 209-12.
146. The rational under both prongs is simple: if a transaction is to be examined under a
weighing formula, there needs to be some criteria by which the transaction is to be measured.
147. See KY. CONST. §§ 177-78.
148. City of Shelbyville ex rel. Shelbyville Mun. Water and Sewer Comm'n v. Common-
wealth Natural Resources and Envtl. Protection Cabinet, 706 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401, 411 (Ky. 1977)).
149. See Hayes v. State Property and Buildings Comm'n, 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987). See
generally Justice Donald C. Wintersheimer, State Constitutional Law, 20 NO. KY. L. REV. 591
(1993).
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similar to those in Washington. 5' The Arizona gift prohibition has
been more widely litigated than similar provisions in other states.'
Further, Arizona recognizes that a use of public funds must ensure the
return of an adequate public benefit.' The Arizona gift analysis
will be adopted here to serve the same purpose.
The Arizona test examines whether the consideration received by
the state in return for an expenditure of public funds to private entities
is equitable and reasonable to ensure adequate compensation for the
public. 5 3 This determination is made by analyzing at the fair
market value of the benefit given to the private entity, the value of the
benefits bestowed on the government by the private entity, and other
material factors attaching to the consideration exchanged.5 4 The
Arizona Supreme Court described the adequate consideration process
as an inquiry into the sufficiency of the consideration exchanged:
The reality of the transaction both in terms of purpose and
consideration must be considered. A panoptic view of the facts of
each transaction is required.... The public benefit to be obtained
from the private entity as consideration for the payment or convey-
ance from a public body must constitute a 'valuable consideration'
but the Constitution may still be violated if the value to be received
by the public is far exceeded by the consideration being paid by the
public.'
Thus, under the adequate consideration test, courts must balance
consideration received by the public against that received by the private
entity; equity and reasonableness must be found in order for the
challenged expenditure to be allowed.
150. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7, with ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
Ironically, the controlling case in Arizona's constitutional analysis of gifts resulted from City of
Tempe v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 527 P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), which involved the lease of
city land for a spring training camp for the Seattle Pilots baseball team. There, the question was
whether $1.00 a year, plus a promise to build a spring training camp for the Seattle Pilots, to
revert to the city in thirty years, constituted valid consideration for a donation of city land.
151. See Wallwork, supra note 3, at 353.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 363.
154. Pilot Properties, 527 P.2d at 522. In Pilot Properties, the trial court was instructed to
determine the fair market value of the property which was leased, to judge the value of having
a new stadium in the city, and to judge the value of the stadium after it reverts to the city. See
generally Scott Meyer, Wistuber v. Paradise Valley Unified School District: Arizona Adopts an
"Equitable and Reasonable Consideration" Test to Identify Gifts of Public Funds to Private Entities,
27 ARIZ. L. REV. 579 (1985).
155. Wistuber v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 687 P.2d 354, 357 (Ariz. 1984) (citing
State v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 340 P.2d 200, 202 (Ariz. 1959)); accord Krornko v. Arizona
Bd. of Regents, 718 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1986).
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The requirement of adequate consideration is not a bright-line
rule, but sets a higher standard of consideration than Adams/Tacoma
Taxpayers. Adequate consideration would require Washington courts,
especially at the trial court level, to closely scrutinize proprietary
transactions, and balance the costs and benefits to the state or locality.
Further, courts would use comparable valuations during the balancing
process because all consideration must be measurable and lasting.
Thus, the simple framework of the adequate consideration test raises
procedural safeguards in gift analysis beyond Adams/Tacoma Tax-
payers, and provides courts with the dichotomy in review that has
worked in the past.
In the end, however, any move from contract law in analyzing
gifts is likely to be labeled an interference with the government's ability
to contract.156 However, if the public is protected by the Washing-
ton Constitution only to the extent already provided by the common
law, the gift provision is meaningless. The gift prohibition was
incorporated into the state's constitution so that public funds and the
public credit would not benefit private interests. Further, in reviewing
gift transactions, the court's goal should not be to maximize the state's
freedom of contract; rather, the court should strive to protect the state
from losses, thus serving its constitutionally mandated role. Therefore,
to avoid the substantive and procedural problems inherent in the
current test, and to enforce the language of the prohibition, a form of
adequacy analysis should be adopted.
IV. CASE STUDIES: THE ADAMS/TACOMA TAXPAYERS TEST V.
ADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION
This section demonstrates how adequacy analysis operates by
applying it to current examples of public financing of private enter-
prise, and by comparing it with the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test.
The case study examples used are legislative appropriations to promote
a thoroughbred race track and state appropriations for the purchase of
railroad freight grain cars for private short line railroads. These
examples were chosen because each demonstrates the range of issues
involved in assessing transactions for gifts, and represents present and
past forms of public financing. The studies are not proposing legal
challenges, but are used solely to analyze gift prohibition issues that
flow from them. In the following section, a brief background of each
example will be provided, which includes the various forms of
156. See generally Spitzer, supra note 15.
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financing. This section will then discusses the gift issues that each
project raises, and analyze how they would be addressed under each
test.
A. Auburn Thoroughbred Race Track
Reviewing state support of "Emerald Downs," a fifty million-
dollar private thoroughbred race track in Auburn, Washington, under
the proposed test analysis, shows that adequacy analysis is consistent
with the legacy of the gift prohibition. This section will demonstrate
that requiring measurable and lasting consideration prevents undue
speculation in government financing policy.
When Longacres Park, the only horse racing facility in Western
Washington, closed in 1992, popular demand encouraged the state
government to sponsor the opening of a new thoroughbred race
track."5 7 The closure of Longacres crippled the horse racing industry
in Washington, leaving many unemployed. Thoroughbred racing in
Western Washington was a $400-million-a-year industry, which
employed 15,000 people, and utilized 25,000 acres of land for
breeding."5 ' Just one year after closure, industry revenues dropped
by $80-million, hundreds of jobs were lost, breeding acreage fell thirty-
eight percent, and Washington Thoroughbred Breeders Association
membership fell from 1,200 to 800.159 In response, the state resolved
to support thoroughbred racing and authorized several assistance
programs including the following three which will be examined in
detail: a fund to support the horse racing industry,160 a deferral of
business taxes, 161 and a four million dollar appropriation providing
infrastructure improvements to support a new racetrack. 62
The first support program authorized by the state created the
Washington Thoroughbred Racing Fund (racetrack account).' 63
Under the program, nonprofit licensees of race meets paid a percentage
157. S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (enacted).
158. Don Hannula, Time to Go to Whip on Auburn Horse Track, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 19,
1995, at B8.
159. Id.
160. WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.105 (1996); see also S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
1995) (enacted).
161. S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (enacted).
162. TERRENE G. PAANANEN, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA-
TION (WSDOT) NORTH WEST REGION, DRAFT ISSUES-ISSUES PAPER: AUBURN THOROUGH-
BRED RACE TRACK AND STATE FUNDING (1995).
163. See WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.105(4) (1996).
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of their daily gross receipts for each day of racing."6 Funds from the
account could only be spent after legislative appropriation, in order to
protect the state's interest in the long-term development of thorough-
bred racing. Further, money was not appropriated until a determina-
tion"' was made that an applicant for a new race track could con-
struct a facility, fund the operation, and satisfy all permit requirements
for construction. 166
The second program provided tax deferrals for a new thorough-
bred race track facility.1 67  Under this program, taxes for retail
sales,' 68 use taxes, 169 and taxes on all material, equipment, and
labor used to construct and equip the new race track facility were
deferred interest free for a five year period. The facility merely was
required to repay the deferred taxes over a ten year period while
interest was never charged. 70
Through the third program, the Legislature committed four
million dollars from the Washington State Department of Transporta-
tion (WSDOT) budget to improve the infrastructure supporting the
Auburn Thoroughbred Race Track. 171  Over one-half of the funds
were earmarked for construction of an arterial leading into the race
track facility. 172  In addition, while the arterial initially would be
owned by the developer of the race track, ownership would revert to
the government when a sufficient traffic need was demonstrated. 73
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.105 required payment to the Washington Horse Racing
Commission (WHRC) 2.5% in 1991 and 1.25% in 1993.
165. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.105, determinations are to be made by the WHRC.
166. Currently no expenditures have been made from the fund, but for the purposes of this
comment it will be assumed there have been.
167. See S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (enacted).
168. Id. In Washington, the retail sales tax is imposed on sales of most articles of tangible
personal property, construction induding labor, repair of tangible personal property, and certain
services. The tax is imposed by both the state and the local governments.
169. In Washington, the state use tax applies to items used in the state, the acquisition of
which was not subject to the retail sales tax, including purchases in other states, purchases from
sellers who do not collect Washington sales tax and items produced for use by the producer. The
tax is imposed by both the state and the local governments.
170. Id. The program was only to apply to a "new thoroughbred race track facility," located
in Western Washington.
171. PAANANEN, supra note 162, at 3.
172. Id. The arterial would serve traffic needs to the facility and the movement of
equipment and animals within the facility. At the present time, this project is held up in
discussions between the developer and the Legislative Transportation Committee. As a result,
this payment plan has not been actualized.
173. Id. The developer would build the arterial, but payment would be routed through
WSDOT or the City of Auburn.
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Each form of financing used for the Auburn race track was
common in form and function, each transaction raises a gift prohibition
issue. Specifically, conditional support of a private enterprise to
construct a private asset constitutes a direct use of public funds for
private purposes. The deferral of taxes which results is providing
interest-free money to a private enterprise realistically can be viewed
as a public subsidy of that private enterprise.'74 And constructing
roads for both private and public purposes, with initial private road
ownership, can be characterized as an indirect public subsidy of private
enterprise.
1. Applying the Test
Application of the proposed adequate consideration test to
determine the constitutionality of each of these support programs first
requires assessing each program for measurable consideration. In each,
the consideration is measurable to some degree, including the receipt
of certain generalized public benefits. In the first program, measurable
consideration results from the racetrack's construction and the resultant
economic impact: job preservation for persons in the horse racing
industry; job creation for corporations in the horse racing industry;
future taxes generated from the facility; and any subsequent economic
growth in King or Pierce Counties due to the operation of the race
track. 7 1
Finding measurable consideration, however, specifically requires
quantifying the proposed economic benefits derived from the race track
support program. It is not enough to say that certain economic results
will occur; concrete evidence is necessary. This includes calculating
the number of jobs that were both preserved and created, and
documenting any development that would not have occurred but for
the race track. In this program, no such measurements were per-
formed. Without this specific information regarding the benefits of the
program, the race track program would be precluded due to the
absence of measurable consideration. Additionally, even if this
information was available, the measurable consideration analysis would
not allow consideration of the "emotional" benefits resulting from the
racetrack program, including appeasing those who enjoy horse racing
174. On its face, a tax deferral is a public subsidy, but court decisions have approved such
financing without questioning its gift characteristics. Cf. Budget Rent-a-Car v. Department of
Revenue, 81 Wash. 2d 171, 500 P.2d 764 (1972); Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth. 96
Wash. 2d 552, 637 P.2d 652 (1981).
175. See S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Ses. (Wash. 1995) (enacted).
1996]
Seattle University Law Review
and supporting the state's horse racing tradition. Because such
concerns are emotional and abstract they are not measurable." 6
"Tradition" is not measurable because emphasis would be placed on
the value of the transmission from generation to generation of
knowledge, customs, and practices in horse racing.
In the tax deferral program, there is measurable consideration
under the proposed analysis. Measurable consideration would be
found in the increased likelihood that the racetrack would generate
sufficient revenue to survive the first ten years of operation, thus
preserving state interests. Additionally, in the third program,
consideration for the private-public arterial is found in the alleviation
of future traffic congestion.
Once it is determined that measurable consideration exists, the
second step requires assessing the programs to determine if that
consideration is lasting. While there is little doubt that the arterial will
alleviate traffic congestion for a number of years to satisfy this
requirement,177 other portions of the program would not pass this
inquiry. Economic impacts due to the race track account and the tax
deferment program are not supported by lasting consideration."'
Without lasting consideration, the programs would be struck under the
gift prohibition analysis. Even if satisfactory forecasts were available,
the economic impact due to both programs remains uncertain.
Although risk is inherent in the gaming industry, risk is compounded
in this case because Emerald Downs' future economic survival is not
certain due to the severe impact other forms of wagering will have on
horse racing." 9 The racetrack must compete for gambling dollars
with both the state lottery and the casinos located on Indian reserva-
tions."O Notably, even under the lasting consideration analysis,
additional questions of risk would not be addressed because the
government must only substantiate the consideration claimed, not
176. See Spitzer, supra note 15.
177. See PAANANEN, supra note 162, at 3.
178. No fiscal note was attached to the legislation.
179. "The University of Kentucky's Department of Equine Administration has studied the
relationship between thoroughbred racing and other forms of wagering ... [finding] that the
lottery has a negative impact of 15 to 20 percent on racing, and casinos have a negative impact
of thirty percent." Alex Fryer, Competition Raises Odds for New Racetrack, PUGET SOUND Bus.
J., Apr. 9, 1993, § 1.
180. The racetrack is situated next to one casino, the Mukleshoot, with eleven others situated
throughout the state. Twelve Washington tribes currently operate eleven casinos in Washington,
with several more predicted in the future.
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investigate its merits.' Thus, application of the first two prongs of
consideration analysis shows in which of the support programs,
consideration is measurable and lasting, instead of illusory.
2. Adequacy of Consideration
The support programs would subsequently be assessed to
determine the adequacy of the consideration which has been ex-
changed. Such an assessment of the racetrack account and tax
deferment program is difficult because no figures exist which help to
substantiate the benefits.'1 2 For purposes of this Comment's analy-
sis, assumptions will be made concerning the benefits bestowed and
received. It will be assumed that the entire racetrack account of one
million dollars was spent in support of Emerald Downs, and that the
benefits conferred on the private race track by the tax deferment are
approximately two million dollars."8 3 The Comment will further
assume that the state will receive revitalization of a large industry, new
jobs, the preservation of jobs, and increased development. On its face,
the state benefits appear disproportionate to the private concerns. The
state pays only three million dollars and is assured of the survival of
a large industry which employs thousands. Thus, state dollars buy
jobs, generate business for local corporations, and encourage the
development of property near the race track. The two programs
appear to achieve an equitable and reasonable, if not disproportionate,
benefit to the State of Washington.
However, the proportionality of return shifts drastically when the
arterial is assessed for adequate consideration.184 While the state will
receive alleviation of traffic, alleviation would occur primarily on King
County roads, which are not maintained by the state. Accordingly,
this is a benefit directed more to King County than to the State of
Washington. Further, while the state would be assured of efficient
customer access to the facility, the private enterprise will gain much
more from this benefit than will the state.
Although the state would eventually receive ownership of the
arterial, such ownership is of little value because the state paid for the
construction of the arterial. Therefore, the balance is disproportional
181. As noted in the discussion of Tacoma Taxpayers, the trial court demanded additional
predictions beyond the first year of the program because long-term savings were claimed.
Without information demonstrating long-term savings, such savings were found speculative and
the program struck down.
182. No fiscal note was attached to the legislation.
183. This estimate would be accurate in the first year, but would vary thereafter.
184. See PAANANEN, supra note 162, at 3.
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because the state receives little if any benefit, but must expend two
million dollars for a road that in reality only directly benefits private
enterprise. Thus, under the proposed test, the program would be
unconstitutional because no equitable and reasonable return is gained
by the state.
The race track demonstrates that adequate consideration analysis
serves courts by requiring litigants to substantiate any claim of
consideration. Notably, the racetrack program generated benefits that
are likely to mislead courts when quantifying the value of consideration
that has been exchanged. A requirement of measurable and lasting
consideration removes unsubstantiated claims and ensures a standard
of review that is free of artificially inflated benefits. Further, by
insisting upon the substantiation of claims, adequacy analysis is
simplified and is more accurate. Unfortunately, this level of scrutiny
is absent from the current Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test.
3. Application of Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers
Under the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test, the constitutionality of
the support programs is reviewed by first looking for donative intent.
There is no donative intent evident in the race track programs. The
race track programs all possessed basic legislative reasoning which
recognized the need for developing a thoroughbred race track, while
ensuring the successful operation of such a track.' Money in the
race track account was to be spent only after legislative appropriation
for the following purposes: benefits and support for the interim
continuation of thoroughbred racing; capital construction of a new race
track facility; programs enhancing the general welfare and safety; and
advancement of the Washington thoroughbred racing industry.'86
Further, tax deferral and road construction both possessed a legislative
direction which could not be regarded as donative intent. The
Legislature supported the tax deferral in order to benefit the general
welfare of the state. 187  Moreover, the appropriation for road con-
struction was intended to improve infrastructure that supports the race
track and the city of Auburn.' Finally, the acts were all deemed"necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health,
or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public
185. See notes 160-62, supra, for the legislative reasoning behind the support programs.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.250 (1996).
187. Id.
188. See PAANANEN, supra note 162, at 3.
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institutions . . . ." " In each instance, however, an argument exists
that while the race track benefits the state as a whole, the benefits
received by the facility developers and owners is so great that a gift
intention existed.
It could be further argued that the programs were intended to
benefit private enterprise; specific statutory language is not needed to
show a gift intention because only two horse racing associations
proposed developing a racetrack in western Washington during this
time. However, speculation on a program's true intentions is not
enough to achieve donative intent. Instead, it is apparent that donative
intent is found only where there is the proverbial "smoking gun. "19
Therefore, because nothing describes these programs as gifts which
gratuitously support the racing industry, the smoking gun will not be
found.
Because donative intent will not be found, the second prong of
Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers examines the transaction for legal consider-
ation. Assuming all money from the racetrack account was appropriat-
ed for capital construction, and the facility was constructed with the
benefit of the tax deferment, the state would be the party receiving the
majority of the consideration. Claims of job preservation, creation, and
development would be accepted by the reviewing court, even though
no realistic quantifying or substantiation would have occurred.
Further, the appeasement of citizen concerns, coupled with the
continuation of the horse racing tradition would be viewed as
generalized public benefits. These would be consideration given in
return for the arterial because of promises that the race track is
attractive to customers, and because of the alleviation of traffic.
However, problems arise when such generalized benefits are
considered to be evidence of legal consideration. Traditionally, the
court only allowed generalized public benefits to serve as consideration
if measurable results occurred which primarily supported the public
interest.1 91 Here, however, even if the consideration was insufficient,
189. S.S. 5281, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (enacted).
190. The problem in determining any form of government intent was summarized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977):
Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular
purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legislators and
administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing consider-
ations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing
of arbitrariness or irrationality.
191. See, e.g., Lancey, 15 Wash. at 9, 45 P. at 646-47.
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allowable exceptions to the gift prohibition would support the
constitutionality of the race track program. Both the racetrack account
and tax deferment program could be sanctioned under the public
purpose exception to the gift prohibition. Here, the Legislature
intended both acts to serve the general welfare of the state, because the
loss of the industry is contrary to general state interests.
4. Comparing the Two Tests
The most glaring difference between adequate consideration
analysis and the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test lies in the degree of
scrutiny. Under the proposed test, problems are found when the state
is forced to quantify the benefits it receives. Investigating the
consideration received reveals that the absence of longevity fails to
support the appropriations made by the state. Under Adams/Tacoma
Taxpayers, however, no problems are found because courts are not
forced to question the validity of the programs' underlying claims of
consideration. Problems lie not only in what the Adams/Tacoma
Taxpayers test fails to examine, but also in what the test subsequently
allows to serve as generalized public benefits. Such recognition of
artificial consideration inflates the value of the benefits that are
received from the racetrack support programs, and denies the public
the corresponding benefits to which the state is entitled.
B. Washington State Department of Transportation Agriculture/
Rail Grain Train Project
The second example of public financing of private enterprise is the
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) Agricul-
ture/Rail (Ag/Rail) rehabilitation project for freight rail cars. This
example similarly illustrates that balancing costs and benefits under the
adequacy analysis makes the government more accountable for its
appropriations. Further, this example shows that adequacy analysis is
not unduly burdensome to judicial decision making.
The Ag/Rail assistance program was established by the Washing-
ton State Executive branch and administered by the Washington State
Energy Office (WSEO).'92 Ag/Rail purchased railroad grain hopper
192. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Executive Branch of Washington State received
funds from the federal Department of Energy (DOE) for several legal settlements involving oil
companies who overcharged consumers during price controls in the 1970s. The federal
government distributed the settlement funds to states' Executive Branches as restitution damages
to promote energy conservation services (Petrol Violation Escrow Fund). In response to the oil
settlement funds, the Executive Branch of Washington State created "Power Washington," a
committee of political organizations and state agencies, to place the funds with state energy
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cars for short line railroads in eastern Washington. The project sought
to preserve rail services for farmers and to promote energy conserva-
tion. "'
In 1993, the first Ag/Rail railroad rehabilitation project began
when the WSDOT Freight Rail Program194 received complaints from
grain shippers in southeastern Washington concerning access to grain
cars. 195  WSDOT commissioned a consultant, Freight Services
Incorporated (FSI), to study the local short-lines: the Blue Mountain
Railroad in Walla Walla and Columbia Counties, and the Palouse
River Railroad in Whitman County.' FSI determined there was a
projects. The Washington State Energy Office (WSEO) was assigned to administer the
settlement funds. Power Washington established the Agricultural Rail Assistance Program
(Ag/Rail), which was a project funded from the Stripper Well Oil Rebate fund (resulting from
the Exxon settlement in the 1970s). The fund sought to provide restitution to oil consuming
farmers, help preserve freight rail services for farmers, and energy conservation. DENNIS
HAMBLET, WSDOT GRAIN TRAIN SUMMARY, 3-4 (WSDOT Rail Branch 1994-5). See also
letter from Frank M. Stewart, Deputy Assistant Sec. Washington State Dept. of Energy to David
W. Sioding, Assistant Director Administration and Finance State of Washington (Aug. 26, 1993);
telephone interview with Gene Schlatter, Senior Fiscal Analyst of the Washington State
Legislative Transportation Committee (July 14, 1995); telephone interview with John Doyle,
WSDOT Programming and Geographic Services Deputy Assistant Secretary (June 20, 1995);
telephone interview with David Sjoding (June 19, 1995); KATRINA PRICE, WASHINGTON STATE
AUDITOR GRAIN TRAIN REPORT (1995); telephone interview with VanDeursen and Constras
(Washington State Auditors); DAVID MARTIN, AGRICULTURE RAIL GRAIN TRAIN PROJECT
(Legislative Transportation Committee, 1-3, (Sept. 1995) (information on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
193. See sources listed supra note 192.
194. In 1983, the Washington State Legislature enacted RCW 47.76 (Rail Freight Service)
and created the Rail Freight Program. The statute was enacted to preserve and plan the state
freight rail system. In 1990 and 1991 the statute was modified to provide fiscal and policy
guidelines for state freight rail programs. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 47.76.240 and 47.76.250
(1996).
195. Grain shippers complained that a rail car shortage existed nationwide and was
exacerbated by natural disasters. The shortfall created logistical problems for growers who were
forced to use alternative (and more expensive) modes of transportation to move their products.
See letter from Robert Abbey, Manager Touchet Valley Grain Growers Inc., to Jeff Schultz of
the WSDOT Rail Branch (Aug. 3, 1993); letter from Tom Jeffries, Manager St. John Grain
Growers, to Jeff Schultz of the WSDOT Rail Branch (Aug. 3, 1993); letter from Robert J.
Holmes, Whitman County Growers, to Jeff Schultz of the WSDOT Rail Branch (Aug. 3, 1993);
letter from Tom Druffel, General Manager Crites Moscow Growers, to Jeff Schultz of the
WSDOT Rail Branch (Aug. 13, 1993); letter from Bruce Bond, Walla Walla Grain Growers, to
Jeff Schultz of the WSDOT Rail Branch (Aug. 17, 1993) (letter on file with the Seattle University
Law Review).
196. E. WILLIAM ANDERSON, A REVIEW OF EASTERN WASHINGTON GRAIN CAR
SUPPLY, IMPACTS ON SHIPPING, AND NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION (prepared
for WSDOT by Freight Services Incorporated (FSI)) (1993). The initial railroad rehabilitation
project proposed for the Ag/Rail Stripper Oil Settlement Fund was track improvement at the Port
of Royal Slope. The project, however, was discontinued as the rail line was embargoed out of
service by the larger Washington Central Railroad. See letter from John Doyle, WSDOT
Programming and Geographic Services Deputy Assistant Secretary, to David Sjoding, Assistant
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grain car shortage and forecast the impact this shortage would have on
grain shippers, railroads, and secondary roads (from increased trucking)
in negative terms.197 Alternatively, the study found direct economic
benefits would result if additional grain cars were introduced to the
region.'98 Consequently, FSI recommended the purchase of grain
cars by the state in order to supplement the southeast region's private
short line railroad industry. 99
In 1993, WSDOT proposed adding thirty-five reconditioned grain
cars to the Blue Mountain Railroad and the Palouse River Rail-
road.200  The WSEO approved the "grain train" project, and
WSDOT bought twenty-nine grain cars for $730,000."1
The WSDOT, Port of Walla Walla, Palouse Blue Mountain
Shippers Association, and the Blue Mountain Railroad reached an
operating agreement for the grain cars.202 The agreement specified
Director Washington State Energy Office (Sept. 18, 1991) (letters on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
197. ANDERSON, supra note 196, at 1-50.
198. ANDERSON, supra note 196, at 2. The initial FSI review of grain car supplies found
probable benefits to grain shippers for $80,000 in annual transportation savings to BMRR and
PRRR for $135,000 in additional revenue, to Union Pacific for $540,000. See also telephone
interview with FSI consultant E.I. Anderson (June 21, 1995). The FSI figures were based on
interviews and some hard data. The WSDOT, however, initially predicted benefits to grain
shippers of $314,969 and an impact on state and local roads (due to increased truck traffic) would
cost $500,000. WSDOT Newsletter, 1 (Nov. 1, 1994) (citing FSI Independent Analysis); KEN
CASAVANT/LENZI PROCEDURE FOR PREDICTING AND ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF RAIL
LINE ABANDONMENTS ON WASHINGTON ROADS (1989); KEN CASAVANT, AN ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF A MULTIMODAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: GRAIN TRANSPORTATION IN
EASTERN WASHINGTON (1993). That figure was updated to $357,000 in the WSEO proposal
with the incorporation of additional variables. See WSDOT PROPOSAL TO THE WSDOE FOR
GRAIN TRAIN PROJECT (1993). On December 19, 1994, grain shipper savings were modified
to $139,000, after WSDOT obtained hard data from the program. WSDOT FREIGHT RAIL
DIVISION PROJECTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS (Dec. 19, 1994). See also letter from James Slakey,
WSDOT Director of Public Transportation and Rail to Washington State Senator Eugene Prince
(Dec. 19, 1994) (information on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
199. ANDERSON, supranote 196, at 16.
200. See WSDOT PROPOSAL, supra note 198. The WSDOT submitted an application with
the WSEO for $730,000 of Ag/Rail money. The WSEO approved the "grain train" project, and
allocated monies from the Stripper Well Oil Settlement fund. See telephone interview with
Katrina Price, Washington State Auditor for Grain Train Report (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
201. In December 1993, the Washington State Transportation Commission approved the
grain train purchase as a pilot project, but requested an evaluation after twelve months of service.
Soon thereafter, on January 18, 1994, WSDOT secured a Limited Purchase Authority from the
Department of General Administration. See letter from Ted Bove, Don Johnson, and Pat Kohler
of Washington State Department of General Administration to WSDOT (Jan. 28, 1994) (on file
with the Seattle University Law Review).
202. See GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-175 (June 15, 1994); GRAIN CAR
OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-0175, amend. 1 (Nov. 21, 1994).
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that the State would retain ownership of the grain cars, and that
WSDOT's promotional graphics would be displayed on the cars.2" 3
Further, the State agreed not to charge rent for the use of the cars.2"
The Port agreed to manage an account for the deposit of revenues
generated by car use and to reimburse the Blue Mountain Railroad for
car maintenance and expenses through this account.21 The railroads
agreed to manage and operate the cars between grain elevators in
eastern Washington and grain export terminals in western Washington.
In addition, the railroad agreed that the Port's account would not be
used for maintenance without permission from the Port.2" 6 Finally,
shippers agreed to use these state-owned grain cars, except where
Union Pacific cars had been used. By 1995, twenty-three grain cars
were placed in service, while three were damaged and repaired during
this period." 7 Thus, there exists a potential gift issue because state
freight rail cars are used by private enterprise rent-free and mainte-
nance-free, while gaining revenue from the state based on transport.
1. Applying the Test
Examining the freight rail program under the proposed test shows
that the consideration exchanged was measurable and lasting. Studies
were conducted of the benefits that would accrue and the duration such
benefits would last. Here, WSDOT bought grain cars for the
railroads, while the railroads incurred no financial obligations toward
WSDOT, or any other party, for the use or maintenance of the grain
cars. Further, the purpose of WSDOT's purchase appears to be for
directing funds to Blue Mountain and Palouse River railroads in order
203. GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-175, supra note 202, at 3; GRAIN CAR
OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-0175, amend. 1, supra note 202, at 1.
204. GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-0175, supra note 202, at 3. According to
WSDOT Freight Rail Manager, Dennis Hamblet, not charging rent for use of grain cars is a
common trade practice. Revenue is instead generated from a system of tariffs imposed when
railcars travel on foreign rail lines. See telephone interview with Dennis Hamblet (June 22, 1995)
(on file with the Seattle University Law Review). However, the FSI report stated that "it is not
unreasonable to require the direct beneficiaries of the cars to pay some cost of ownership."
ANDERSON, supra note 196, at 13.
205. The account was known as the "Grain Car Revolving Fund," and was managed per
RCW 36.29.020 and RCW 53.36.050. GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-175, supra
note 202, at 2.
206. The railroad was not to receive profits from grain car repair and maintenance, but to
earn revenue based on transportation of products. GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT,
amend. 1, supra note 202, at 3.
207. Currently, the utilization of grain cars exceeds original performance expectation, with
the program producing enough revenue to purchase more grain cars. See telephone interview with
Dennis Hamblet, supra note 204.
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to preserve service to farmers in the regions. The Blue Mountain and
Palouse River Railroads were estimated by Freight Services Incorpo-
rated to benefit by $135,000 annually from an increase in general car
supply, while Union Pacific would benefit $540,000 annually, 2°8 and
the Palouse Blue Mountain Shippers Association would save its
members $80,000 in shipping costs. 2 9 The public received $500,000
in savings through benefits to WSDOT and general benefits to state
transportation and the economy.2 10  WSDOT knew of these figures
before proposing the plan to WSDOE. Further, the contract between
WSDOT and the railroads stated that "[ilt is the intent of AGREE-
MENT to provide cars to the RAILROAD with which the RAIL-
ROAD will earn revenues based on transportation."2 1  WSDOT
also stated the purpose of the grain train project was to "[p]reserve the
viability of light density rail lines as one part of Washington's freight
transportation system, as directed by the Washington State Legisla-
ture. "212 Thus, all necessary data was present to determine the
reasonableness of the consideration.
However, this transaction is not limited to named parties, because
of the broad secondary effects." 3 The freight rail program impacted
other state industries, particularly the trucking industry. When
WSDOT contracted with the railroads, revenue was removed from the
trucking industry because a cheaper alternative became available. Some
estimate the trucking industry's losses amount to $400,000 annual-
ly.214  However, because consideration would only be measured as
between the state and railroads, all these other parties would not be
considered. Thus, there was a quantifiable result that was ignored by
the gift prohibition even though the costs of the project outweigh the
benefits.
208. See ANDERSON, supra note 196, at 2. This figure is based on an increase in revenue
from 800 additional carloads of grain shipped to the Portland/Vancouver area, and an agreement
between Union Pacific and the short lines as to an 80% to 20% split of revenue. See telephone
interview with E.I. Anderson, supra note 198.
209. Even if Union Pacific is not included in a weighing of the benefit's direction, it would
not make the railroads and farmers benefit incidental to the public's benefit. Other indicators
beside economic show that the state intended to benefit private parties before the public as a
whole.
210. See HAMBLET, supra note 192, at 1.
211. GRAIN CAR OPERATING AGREEMENT, RR-01 75, supra note 202, at 3.
212. See HAMBLET, supra note 192, at 1.
213. See HAMBLET, supra note 192. See also Letter from James Slakey, supra note 198.
214. See Letter from Washington State Senator Eugene Prince to Jeff Doyle, General
Council Legislative Transportation Committee (Dec. 19, 1994).
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2. Adequacy of Consideration
Under adequacy analysis, the consideration is insufficient because
the benefits gained by private parties unreasonably outweigh the
benefits enjoyed by the public. In the proposal, railroads were only
one group of beneficiaries; other benefits were specifically designated
for the farmers. "A deprivation fund was established to eventually
replace the cars, but no interest on the invested capital would be
collected so that the economics would flow to the shippers. '2 15  The
private benefit is illustrated by the WSDOT grain car report, which
stressed the car fleet would "provide farmers with significant additional
savings flowing from lowered car acquisition costs passed on the
railroad." Thus, the fact that WSDOT even stated to WSDOE that
it intended to provide for injured farmers is conclusive evidence that
the program violates the gifting prohibition.
Once the consideration is found to be both measurable and
lasting, the balancing test for adequacy analysis is applied. The FSI
study states that the railroads would benefit by $675,000 in additional
revenue if grain cars were purchased, while grain shippers and farmers
would save $139,000 in annual transportation costs. 16 This resulted
in a benefit of $814,000 to private parties, while the State gained
$500,000.17 Obviously, the benefit is proportionately larger for the
private parties, is directed only to private parties, and also harms other
state interests, particularly the trucking industry. Here, the costs borne
by the State illustrates that there is too great a burden on the public
interest with a corresponding gain to private interests.21 Because
WSDOT's purchase of grain cars does not sufficiently benefit the
State, it is an unreasonable gift.
The freight rail program demonstrates that balancing public and
private interests to determine the adequacy of consideration exchanged
is not difficult when all forms of consideration are substantiated.
Further, the program demonstrates that adequate consideration analysis
serves to protect the public purse. A court that takes a panoptic view
215. WSDOT PROPOSAL, supra note 198.
216. WSDOT FREIGHT RAIL PROJECTIONS, supra note 198.
217. Id.
218. As a side note, it would be important to determine what WSDOT really intended for
the settlement money. Did WSDOT want to preserve light density rail in Columbia and
Whitman counties? Surely, the answer is yes, it is their mandate. Further, did WSDOT want
to assist farmers in those counties through the settlement moneys? The answer again is yes,
without such a goal WSDOT could not have received money from the fund. Thus, what
WSDOT's intentions were are unclear, however, evidence tends to support its mandate over the
farmers settlement monies.
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of the freight rail program would find that the consideration received
by the public is far exceeded by the benefits paid out by the public.
Thus, review for adequate consideration ensures reasonable transactions
while preventing government speculation when using public funds.
Unfortunately, this higher level of scrutiny would not be applied under
the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test.
3. Application of the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers Test
As previously explained, the Adams/Tacoma Taxpayers test first
assesses the transaction for donative intent. According to the WSDOT
the objective of the project was to preserve the viability of light density
rail lines, reduce road maintenance costs, and conserve energy. These
are not items which typically constitute donative intent because the
Legislature's objective on its face was the furtherance of public policy.
However, the WSDOT Rail Freight Program also stated that the
purpose of the expenditure was providing financial support to the Blue
Mountain and Palouse River railroads.219 Without the expenditure,
it was likely that both railroads would go out of business; funding the
program fulfilled the Legislature's statutory mandate of providing
essential rail service. Still, donative intent would probably not be
found because these objectives were pursued as a state mandate, not for
gifting purposes. Thus, while donative intent is evident merely from
the language of the mandate the Rail Freight Program, it does not
reach the level of the necessary smoking gun.
Alternatively, donative intent is evident if a secondary definition
test looking for "grossly inadequate return" is applied. As stated
previously "grossly inadequate return" results when the transaction is
so unbalanced that it constitutes a gift. In the present matter, the
grain cars were provided to the railroads without charging rent and
without demanding compensation for the grain cars. The return to the
state was quantifiable due to the fulfillment of a legislative mandate.
If it could be shown that WSDOT acted ultra vires, or that the
fulfillment of its mandate could not be accomplished through such an
expenditure, then donative intent is evident. Thus, if a free rental
qualifies as a gift, then there is donative intent.
However, assuming that no donative intent was found, the next
step requires searching for legal consideration. The return that
WSDOT received for the transaction was a reduction of road
maintenance cost by $100,000 annually, and the prevention of
219. See telephone interview with Dennis Hamblet, supra note 204. See also ANDERSON,
supra note 196, at 13.
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structural impact on highways and local roads of increased traffic from
truck, which would have totaled $400,000 annually. Moreover, the
increase in freight rail further reduced road congestion, increased road
safety, and enabled the state to save money in road maintenance
gaining other less tangible benefits.220 WSDOT also believed the
program would help preserve the viability of light density rail in the
region, the energy efficient movement of goods, and allow Washington
grain prices to remain competitive. The benefits are sufficient
consideration, and certain returns are quantifiable. The exchange also
meets the required standards of legal consideration because the
promises were not illusory.
4. Comparing the Two Tests
The application of the current test raises serious concerns. First,
the State's return is a generalized public benefit so that it is not
supported by consideration. In the present case, the return is to a
specified small group, not the public as a whole. The transaction does
save money for southeastern Washington by removing the road
maintenance burden from WSDOT, and does help maintain competi-
tive grain prices through efficient transportation221 Additionally, the
public benefit is economic, WSDOT gains by reducing liabilities, and
the state economy gains by increasing efficiency. Such an economic
benefit, however, if taken to its logical end, seemingly produces an
unconstitutional transaction. For example, if the State were to provide
Boeing with electricity, without a return of consideration, for the
purpose of supporting Boeing, which would secondarily increase state
revenue, most citizens would object.
Under the present test, even if no consideration is evident, the
transaction would still be upheld under the court's government
function exception. Here, WSDOT's mandate under RCW 47.76 is
to maintain essential rail service. In each case WSDOT performed
this government function by purchasing grain cars to be used by the
railroads. Further, WSDOT maintained an essential rail service and
helped injured oil consumers. Thus the furtherance of a recognized
governmental function occurred.
The grain train program demonstrates that when the consideration
exchanged is measurable and lasting, balancing costs and benefits
under an adequacy analysis is not difficult. Moreover, such an analysis
220. See HAMBLET, supra note 192.
221. See letters from grain producers in southeast Washington addressed to WSDOT, supra
note 195.
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forces the government to develop programs that are supported by a
corresponding benefit. Under the current test, however, WSDOT's
program is constitutional because the evident donative intent is ignored
and the consideration exchanged will be viewed as sufficient. Thus, as
in the race track example, the present test fails to address the illusory
nature of the consideration supporting the program, while allowing
generalized public benefits to serve as legal consideration.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of the gift prohibition and the problems inherent in
the present application point to a need for reconstructing the test that
is applied. As it currently stands, the gift prohibition is not entirely
dead, but clearly is subject to a waning application. The State and its
subdivisions are not prohibited from entering into transactions that
unduly benefit private enterprise. The case studies and the language
of Adams/Tacoma test demonstrate how the requirements of donative
intent and sufficient consideration allow lawyers to devise methods
which avoid the gift prohibition and bypass the few remaining
substantive requirements. Thus, the current test is a paper tiger,
malleable to the constitutional needs of practically any proprietary
transaction entered into by state and local governments. However, a
porous gift prohibition was not what the framers' intended and not
what case law has dictated until recently. The gift prohibition was
enacted for public policy and economic reasons, and some measures
should be taken by the judiciary to ensure Washington courts respect
those principles.
The test of adequate consideration, plus the requirement that the
consideration be measurable and lasting, would provide courts with an
efficient and effective mechanism to renew the gift prohibition. In the
above case studies, and in Arizona, the requirement of adequate
consideration provided numerous benefits over the current analysis for
donative intent and sufficient consideration. Here, government
proprietary transactions are no longer masked from proper review
because courts only seek prima facie evidence of consideration.
Instead, under adequate consideration analysis, government trans-
actions that best benefit the public will be pursued, because the
consideration exchanged will be subject to an individualized balancing
analysis. Adequate consideration also respects the intentions of the
framers, prevents government involvement in speculative private
financing, requires the state and its subdivisions to receive equitable
returns from their proprietary transactions, and does not allow for
returns containing only illusory consideration. The equitable nature of
[Vol. 20:199
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the adequate consideration test preserves the public purse, which not
only constrains the government in risk-taking, but also makes
government more responsible.
Historically, Washington citizens have demanded responsibility
from the government at all levels. From Initiative 601 to the Growth
Management Act, Washington has improved the lives of its citizens by
seeking rational public policies. In order to continue this important
tradition, the Washington State Supreme Court should take the
initiative to revisit Article VIII, sections 5 and 7, and once again
restrict the state and local government from the speculative attractions
of private enterprise."
